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Does The Fourteenth Amendment
Forbid De Facto Segregation?
Charles J. Bloch
THE PROVISION of the fourteenth amendment pertinent to the
~' question - if any provision thereof is pertinent - is: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' The essence of the question is: If
segregation exists which is not
THE AUTHOR (A.B., University of the result of the enforcement
Georgia) is the Editor of the Georgia by a state of its laws, is there a
Bar Journal, and a practicing attorney in
Macon, Georgia. violation of the fourteenth
amendment?
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Construction and Application of the Fourteenth Amendment
It is fundamental that for there to be a violation of the four-
teenth amendment in the respect here under consideration, there
must appear a denial by a state of equal protection of its laws. There
can be no doubt as to what the Congress intended by the use of the
word "State" in the fourteenth amendment. The word "State" or
"States" had been used seventy times in the original Constitution.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt as to what the Congress meant
by the word "laws." The word "law" or "laws" as meaning statute
or statutes enacted by a legislative body, state or federal, had been
used twenty-five times in the Constitution.
(1) The Supreme Court Cases.-When, after the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, it first became necessary for the
courts to construe or apply it, the Supreme Court spoke certainly
and clearly:
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from denying to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;
but this provision does not, any more than the one which precedes
it, and which we have just considered, add anything to the rights
which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism.
Every republican government is in duty bound to protect all its
citizens in the enjoyment of this principle, if within its power. That
duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there.
The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the
States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but
no more. The power of the national government is limited to the
enforcement of this guaranty2
So at the October Term, 1875, just seven years after the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment, a Chief Justice of the United States,
Morrison R. Waite, appointed by President Grant from the State of
Ohio, declared the meaning of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The opinion which he wrote, and from
which quotation has been made, had the concurrence of three other
justices appointed from the states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
New York by President Grant. It also had- the concurrence of four
other justices appointed from the states of Ohio, Illinois, Iowa, and
California by President Lincoln. Therefore, the pronouncement
can hardly be deemed a sectional one.
There followed the Virginia cases;3 then the Civil Rights
Cases4 decided in 1883 by Justices Bradley, Miller, Field, Woods,
Matthw's, Gray, Blatchford, and Chief Justice Waite - not a
Southerner among them.. In the opinion in the Civil Rights Cases,'
Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, quoted that portion of the
fourieenth amendment with which this article commences.6 Im-
meditey preceding that quotation, he wrote: "The first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment (which is the one. relied on), after
declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, and of the
several States, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon
the States."' Immediately following this quotation, he wrote:
It is State action of a particular chara&er that is prohibited. In-
dividual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of
the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies
and makes void all State legislation and State action of every kind,
which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in order
2. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875). ' (Emphasis added.)
3. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
4. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. Id. at 11.
6. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
7. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10 (1883).
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that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere brutum
fulmen, the last section of the amendment invests Congress with
power to enforce it by appropiate legislation. To enforce what?
To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for
correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts,
and thus to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This
is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the
whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate
upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but
to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action,
of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a
code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to
provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and
the action of State officers executive or judicial, when those are
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Four-
teenth Amendment, but they are secured by way of prohibition
against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and
privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the pur-
pose of carrying such prohibition into effect, and such legislation
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or
State proceedings and be directed to the correction of their opera-
tion and effect.8
Later, Justice Bradley concluded:
And so in the present case, until some State law has been passed,
or some State action, through its officers or agents, has been taken,
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said
amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be
called into activity; for the prohibitions of the amendment are
against State laws and acts done under State authority .... In fine,
the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf
is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but cor-
rective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and
which by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or en-
forcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or
take, and which by the amendment, they are prohibited from com-
mitting or taking.9
So - if the clock is turned back to the fifteen year era immediately
following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it will be
found that it was firmly established as a principle of constitutional
law that denials of equal protection within the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment must be actions of state officers prescribed
by state statutes or actions of state officers deliberately and pur-
posefully denying to certain people the equal protection of the laws.
8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id. at 13-14.
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Justices, natives of Ohio, New York, California, and Massachusetts
combined with others from Northern states in establishing these
fundamental principles.
(2) State Court Construction.-While this principle was be-
ing established, other groups of judges in state courts in Ohio,
Indiana, California, and New York were deciding just what state
laws and state acts were prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
In a series of cases, these courts were deciding that the fourteenth
amendment did not forbid even de jure segregation. They recog-
nized that a state court could not by law deny to persons within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. But, they decided that
state laws segregating the races in public schools were not denials of
the equal protection of the laws.
The Ohio case, State ex rel. Garmes v. McCam, ° was decided by
the supreme court of that state in 1871, just three years after the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment. There, the court held that
the public school law of Ohio, as amended in 1864, authorizing the
classification of children in schools on the basis of color did not con-
travene the fourteenth amendment in the light of the fact that a
school for colored children was provided, "equal in every respect to
those for white children .... ."" In like manner, the Indiana Su-
preme Court decided Corey v. Carter,2 in 1874, six years after
the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. There the court held
that the Indiana Act of 1869, providing for separate schools for col-
ored children, did not conflict with the fourteenth amendment.
The California case was also decided by the supreme court of
that state in 1874. In Ward v. Flood,'" the court ruled on the effect
of the fourteenth amendment upon the school law of California en-
acted two years after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment.
The coiart held that the California law providing for the education
of children of African descent in separate schools was not in con-
flict with the fourteenth amendment.
At just about the same time that the Supreme Court of the
United States decided the Civil Rights Cases,'4 the court of last re-
sort of New York was deciding a school case similar tO those pre-
viously decided in Indiana, Ohio and California. In People ex rel.
10. 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871).
11. Ibid.
12. 48 Ind. 327 (1874).
13. 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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King v. Gallagher,"5 the New York court cited the Ohio and Indiana
cases with approval, deciding as they had that all that was required
by the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 187516
was "the privilege of obtaining an education under the same advan-
tages, and with equal facilities, as those enjoyed by any other indi-
vidual."'7  Speaking through Chief Judge Ruger, the majority of
the court stated that "equality and not identity of privileges and
rights is what is guaranteed to the citizen .. ."18 No one of these
cases was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. From
them spawned the doctrine that a state did not deprive a person
within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws so long as
all enjoyed equality of the rights and privileges afforded by the
state.
B. The Separate But Equal Doctrine
This "separate but equal" doctrine was first announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1896 in the landmark case of
Plessy v. Ferguson.9 There in question was a Louisiana statute that
required railroad companies to provide equal, but separate, accom-
modations for the white and colored races by separate or divided
coaches. The statute was assailed as violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court held, however, that it was not contrary to
the fourteenth amendment. In the course of the opinion, the Court
stated that "the object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the na-
ture of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political
equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfac-
tory to either."2 °  The Court went on to state that "similar laws
have been enacted by Congress under its general power of. legisla-
tion over the District of Columbia... 2 as well as by the legislatures
of many of the States, and have been generally if not uniformly,
sustained by the courts."'
15. 93 N.Y. 438 (1883).
16. 18 Star. 335 (1875).
17. People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 439, 447 (1883).
18. Id. at 445.
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. Id. at 544. (Emphasis added.)
21. Here the Court cited D.C. REv. STAT. § 281-83, 310, 319, 20 Star. 107 (1878)
(now D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-807, -1109 to -1111, -1113 (1961)).
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896). The Court cited the Ohio, Cali-




(1) First Application in a School Case.-The "separate but
equal" doctrine was applied in a school case for the first time by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1927. In Gong Lum v.
Rice,23 a unanimous Court24 speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft
stated: "Were this a new question, it would call for very full argu-
ment and consideration; but we think that it is the same question
which has been many times decided to be within the constitutional
power of the State Legislature to settle, without intervention of the
federal courts under the federal constitution."" To demonstrate
that the "separate but equal" doctrine was specifically applied by the
Court in that school case, the last paragraph of Chief Justice Taft's
opinion is revealing. He stated: "Most of the cases cited arose, it is
true, over the establishment of separate schools as between white
pupils and black pupils; but we cannot think that the question is any
different, or that any different result can be reached, assuming the
cases above cited to be rightly decided, where the issue is between
white pupils and the pupils of the yellow races. The decision is
within the discretion of the state in regulating its public schools, and
does not conflict with the fourteenth amendment."'26  The syllogism
is dear: if the black race is not denied equal protection by applica-
tion of the doctrine, the yellow race is not; the black race is not un-
der the decisions cited, therefore the yellow race is not. The doctrine
had to, be applied in order for this judgment to have been rendered.
(2) The Pre-Brown Generation.-In the generation which in-
tervened from -the date of the decision in Gong Lam to May 17,
1954, there were several decisions of the Court which illustrate that
deliberate state action must appear for there to be a violation of the
equal protection clause. Some of these also show that the "separate
but equal" doctrine remained as a principle of American Constitu-
tional law. Just before Chief Justice Taft's decision in Gong Lum,
the Court had dismissed, for want of jurisdiction; an appeal in a case
involving a restrictive covenant in an indenture.27 The dismissal,
so far as the alleged application of the fourteenth amendment was
23. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
24. The Court deciding the Gong Lum case included among its members Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and Harlaii Fiske Stone, the last named
of whom was later made Chief Justice.
25. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927). The Court again, just as in
Plessy v. Ferguson, cited the Ohio, New York, California, and Indiana cases. See note
22 supra.
26. Id. at 87.
27. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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concerned, ensued because it did not prohibit private individuals
from entering into contracts respecting the control and disposition of
their own property. Said the Court: "It is State action of a particu-
lar character that is prohibited."28
Not many years thereafter, a case arose in which the Court was
of the opinion that the necessary state action appeared. Thus, in
Shelley v. Kraemer," the Court reiterated the rule that restrictive
covenants based on race or color standing alone do not violate any
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and stated that so
long as the purpose of the covenant is effectuated by voluntary ad-
herence to its terms, there has been no action by the state and the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment are not violated. But, when
state courts move to enforce such covenants by injunction or other-
wise, the requisite state action is supplied. In the course of its opin-
ion, the Court said that when the effect of state action "is to deny
rights subject to the protection of the Fourteenth amendment, it is
the obligation of this court to enforce the constitutional com-
mands.""° A right to be free of denial of equal protection of the
laws is one of such rights.
Also in that interval between Gong Lum31 and 1954, the ques-
tion of state action was involved in several cases in which voting
rights were discussed and adjudicated. A discussion of two of them
must suffice for the purpose here. One was a Texas primary case
3 -2
in which the Court held that the exclusion of Negroes from voting
in a Democratic primary to select nominees for a general election -
although by resolution of a state convention of the party its member-
ship was limited to white citizens - was state action in violation of
the federal constitution. The other was also a Texas primary case"s
involving the fifteenth amendment. There it was stated that the
fifteenth "not the Fourteenth, outlawed discrimination on the basis
of race or color with respect to vote."34  It is important because it
is state action, state abridgement, state denial which is forbidden by
the fifteenth amendment. In this respect, the Court said that "the
application of the prohibition of the Fifteenth Amendment to 'any
State' is translated by legal jargon to read 'State action.' . . . The vital
28. Id. at 330. (Emphasis added.)
29. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
30. Id. at 20.
31. Gong Lur v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
32. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
33. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
34. Id. at 472.
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requirement is State responsibility - that somewhere, somehow, to
some extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied
with State power, into any scheme by which colored citizens are de-
nied voting rights merely because they are colored."'
There are other cases in that era in which not only "state action"
but the "separate but equal" doctrine was involved. Among them
are three, all of which reveal that the doctrine then remained vital.
In the first, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada," the Court held that
the State of Missouri was bound to furnish Lloyd Gaines, a Negro
within its borders, facilities for legal education substantially equal
to those which the state then afforded for persons of the white race,
whether or not other Negroes sought the same opportunity. 7 In
so holding, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, quoted
the old phrase: "The equal protection of the laws is 'a pledge of the
protection of equal laws."' 8  In the Texas Law School case,39 the
opinion was written by Chief Justice Vinson. There, the Court held
that "petitioner may claim his full constitutional right: legal educa-
tion equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other races.
Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as
offered by the State."4 The Court had thus applied the yard stick
of "separate but equal" to the facts appearing with reference to the
separate law school as offered by the state, but found the separate
law school lacking in essential requisites to prevent its being treated
as equal to that offered to white students.
On the same day, the Court decided the Oklahoma graduate stu-
dent case.41 There the only question decided was whether a state
might, after admitting a student to graduate instruction in its state
university, afford him different treatment from other students solely
because of his race. The Court held that, in order to produce qual-
ity, certain state-imposed restrictions which produced inequalities had
to be removed. Said the Court:
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position when
these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart by his
fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast differ-
ence - a Constitutional difference - between restrictions imposed
35. Id. at 473. (Emphasis added.)
36. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
37. Id. at 351.
38. Id. at 350, quoting from Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
39. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
40. Id. at 635. (Emphasis added.)
41. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students,
and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents
no such bar .... The removal of the state restrictions will not neces-
sarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and
choices. But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appel-
lant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students
on his own merits.... We hold that under these circumstances the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the
state based upon race. Appellant, having been admittted to a state-
supported graduate school, must receive the same treatment at the
hands of the state as students of other races. 42
Here is a clear-cut ruling that it is de jure segregation, state-imposed
discrimination, which the fourteenth amendment forbade. In what
respect, therefore, was that ruling altered by the public school cases
decided four years later?
II. DE JURE vs. DE FACTO SEGREGATION
A. The Question Decided in Brown
In 1950, the "separate but equal" doctrine may have been gasp-
ing for breath, but it still survived. It was not until May 17, 1954,
that it received its death blow, and then only with respect to public
education, or so the Court then said. That day, the Court decided a
group of four cases which are colloquially grouped under the name
Brown v. Board of Educ.43 The Brown case from Kansas originated
in an action brought by Negro children to enjoin enforcement of a
Kansas statute which permitted separate schools for Negro and white
children. A companion South Carolina case was commenced in a
similar action to enjoin provisions in that state's constitution and
code requiring such segregation.44 The Virginia" and Delaware "
cases were brought on similar grounds to enjoin state constitutional
and legislative provisions requiring segregation. So - in none of
these cases, therefore, was there any doubt of "state action."
The only question decided by the Supreme Court in the Brown
case was that the "separate but equal" doctrine was not applicable
to public education - that the fourteenth amendment forbade de
jure segregation of the races in public schools. There can be no
doubt of that, for the Court posed the "question presented" as fol-
42. Id. at 641-42. (Emphasis added.)
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
45. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952).




lows: "Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities?"47  Having posed the question, the
Court succinctly answered it: "We believe that it does."48  Also,
the Court concluded "that in the field of public education the doc-
trine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plain-
tiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."49 The words in italics are emphasized to make dear
that the segregation complained of was de jure segregation - segre-
gation in each of the four cases compelled or permitted by a state
law, segregation deliberately ordered by state school authorities pur-
suant to state law theretofore valid according to century-old decisions
of many courts. While American courts might have "labored with
the doctrine for over half a century,"5 the labors had produced a
result which was unanimous.
There is not one word in Brown v. Board of Educ."1 that may
fairly be said to indicate that the court intended to decide anything
but that segregation of white and colored children in public schools
imposed by school authorities under sanction or compulsion of state
law was violative of the fourteenth amendment. If there should be
any doubt about that in the mind of anyone, that doubt will disap-
pear after reading Chief Justice Warren's opinion rendered after
further argument in the cases on the question of relief."2  In that
opinion, rendered a year after the original decision, the Chief Jus-
tice explained what he had held in these words: "All provisions of
federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimina-
tion must yield to this principle . . . that racial discrimination in
public schools is unconstitutional." 3  For the further argument on
the question of relief, the Court "invited the Attorney General of
the United States and the Attorneys General of all states requiring or
permitting racial discrimination in public education to present their
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 495. (Emphasis added.)
50. .d. at 491.
51. Id. at 483.
52. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). -
53. Id. at 298.
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views... ."" De jure, not de facto segregation, was the subject of
the judgment of the Court, and the arguments which preceded and
followed it.
B. Is There an Affirmative Duty to Integrate After Brown?
(1) The Established Principle.-Revolutionary as was the de-
cision in Brown in its rendition and subsequent application, the
Court has not sought to overturn the established principle of consti-
tutional law that "the unlawful administration by state officers of a
state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to
those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of
intentional or purposeful discrimination." 5  In one of its first
cases 56 construing the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court held that a mere showing that Negroes
were not included in a particular jury was not enough; there
must be a showing of actual discrimination because of race.57 Down
through the years, this has been the law of the land: "The purpose
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms
of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted
agents."58  No different purpose was attributed to the amendment
by the Court either in Brown or any case since decided.
(2) Recent Affirmations of the Principle.-That no different
purpose was so attributed to the amendment is graphically illustrated
by the case which had its origin in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana. In Bell v. School City,59
the plaintiff presented, among others, the question whether she
and other members of the class "have a constitutional right to
attend racially integrated schools and the defendant has a constitu-
tional duty to provide and maintain a racially integrated school sys-
tem.," The plaintiffs conceded that this question had not been
passed upon by the Supreme Court, or by any other court where the
question had been specifically presented. They relied upon certain
54. Id. at 298-99.
55. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).
56. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
57. Id. at 322-23.
58. Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918).
59. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1963), all'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964).
60. Id. at 820.
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language from the decision in Brown to the effect that "to separate
them [Negroes] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone."'" They also relied on certain
language in Taylor v. Board of Educ.62 and Branche v. Board of
Educ.'
The District Judge found no violation by the defendant of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. In so doing, he alluded to the lan-
guage of the three-judge district court in Kansas when it was carry-
ing out the instructions of the Supreme Court as delivered after the
last argument in the Brown case. He stated:
It was stressed at the hearing that such schools at Buchanan are all-
colored schools and that in them there is no intermingling of col-
ored and white children. Desegregation does not mean that there
must be intermingling of the races in all school districts. It means
only that they may not be prevented from intermingling or going
to school together because of race or color.
If it is a fact, as we understand it is, with respect to Buchanan
School that the district is inhabited entirely by colored students, no
violation of any constitutional rights results because they are com-
pelled to attend the school in the district in which they live.p
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the District Judge in the Bell case.65 That court, in addition
to quoting from Brown v. Board of Educ.,6 quoted this succinct
statement from Briggs v. Elliott: 7 "The Constitution, in other
words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimina-
tion.""8 The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari
in the case on May 4, 1964.9
Since Bell was decided, federal courts in Illinois7" and Ohio7
have followed it. In Lynch v. Kenston School Dist.,72 decided with-
61. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
62. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961).
63. 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
64. Brown v. Board of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468, 470 (D. Kan. 1955).
65. Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
66. 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan. 1955).
67. 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
68. Id. at 777.
69. Bell v. School City, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
70. Webb v. Board of Educ., 223 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
71. Lynch v. Kenston School Dist., 229 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
72. Ibid.
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in three weeks after certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in
the Bell case, an Ohio District Court distinctly found that constitu-
tional rights in this area cannot be infringed by de facto segregation
which results from good faith adherence to a neighborhood school
policy. The court also noted two New York District Court cases73
and said of them that to the extent that they are in conflict with the
case before it, "the court believes that they were erroneously decided
and it respectfully declines to follow their precedents."74
Despite the nine-way stretch which has been applied to the Con-
stitution and the amendments thereto in certain areas, it is difficult
to see how the language, history, and repeated constructions of the
fourteenth amendment could be so distorted as to read into it a veto
of de facto segregation.
73. Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Blanche v. Board
of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
74. Lynch v. Kenston School Dist., 229 F. Supp. 740, 744 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
